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ENTROPY1 AND  
THE NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM2 
Junius W. Peake* 
I was invited to the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & 
Commercial Law symposium to discuss my predictions for and thoughts on 
some of the problems facing and changes occurring in the current national 
market system. My thoughts are presented from a unique perspective. I 
have been an executive in the securities industry, and governor and vice-
chairman of a self-regulatory organization. I founded the first electronic 
futures market and have been a consultant to government agencies, markets 
and market participants. Most recently I was an academic for 14 years. I am 
now retired. 
During almost all that time, I followed the torturous path of the 
development of the national market system. I have written and spoken 
about it for more than thirty years. As a result, this essay reflects my 
thoughts on the past, present, and future state of the national market system. 
I. A BIT OF HISTORY 
My first exposure to market structure came when, in 1965, I was placed 
in charge of the operations of the brokerage firm Shields & Company. 
Although my area of responsibility did not include floor or over-the-counter 
trading, it encompassed the operational results of those activities. In those 
days, operational systems were almost entirely manual. Automation 
consisted of tabulating machines, key punches and Addressograph plates. 
The mechanics of floor and over-the-counter trading were accomplished by 
scribbles, shouts and telephone calls. 
Needless to say, these archaic technologies contributed to what would 
be called the “back office crisis,” which continued until the mid-1970s. 
Errors were rampant; correcting them was time-consuming and costly. DKs, 
or Don’t Knows—which stood for transactions on exchange floors that 
were not confirmed by both parties—were legion and many firms lost 
bookkeeping control. Securities were not delivered in a timely fashion, and 
the number of “fails,” which were transactions that did not close within 
normal settlement times, escalated to numbers that placed more than a few 
firms into financial jeopardy or bankruptcy. 
With much time and effort, the operational side of the business was 
finally addressed with considerable success. Consensus was achieved when 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Entropy: “In software, it is the disorder and jumble of its logic, which occurs after the 
program has been modified over and over.” Entropy Definition, http://www.pcmag.com/ 
encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=entropy&i=42666,00.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
 2. Please note that portions of this paper incorporate or have been adapted from my previous 
writings. 
 *  Junius W. Peake is Monfort Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Finance at Kenneth 
Monfort College of Business, University of Northern Colorado. 
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both the banking and brokerage industries finally realized that the clearance 
and settlement part of the business was almost entirely on the expense side 
of the ledger, and that cooperation and consolidation of these functions 
would result in enormous cost savings and greater efficiency for all 
participants, including the customers. 
Major milestones in resolving these operational problems came about 
through the establishment of the Committee on Uniform Securities 
Identification Procedures (CUSIP) number for identifying publicly-traded 
securities, the implementation of what was known as a continuous net 
settlement system for clearing houses, and the metamorphosis of those 
entities into a national clearing, settlement and depository system. 
The modernization of these back office functions came about from 
1966–1973, starting with CUSIP. During the same time period, lots of 
discussions about problems with the trading side of the business were held 
and Congress started to examine the problems of the securities industry 
with the view toward determining whether legislation was needed. 
Congress—and others such as myself—began to explore whether 
trading systems are just as much cost centers as the clearing and settlement 
activities. Who does and should pay their costs? The same universe is 
involved in both: investors and issuers. I attended a conference at New 
York University in 1979 when the executive vice president of the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stated that automating the NYSE would cost 
as much as $20–$30 million.3 He rhetorically asked where the industry 
would ever find that much money. In contrast, twenty-five years later, when 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued the proposed 
Regulation NMS4 in 2004, the Commission stated: 
The Commission staff estimates that there would be an initial one-time 
burden of 200 burden hours per SRO or 1,800 hours, and 150 burden hours 
per non-SRO order execution facility or 1,015,200 hours, for a total of 
1,017,000 burden hours to establish policies and procedures designed to 
prevent the execution of a trade-through for an estimated one-time initial 
cost of $145,469,475. The Commission estimates a capital cost of 
approximately $101,655,000 for both SROs and non-SROs resulting from 
outsourced legal work.5 
Those figures, of course, do not include the enormous costs of hardware 
and programming the millions of lines of code that will be needed to 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Morris Mendelson, Junius W. Peake, & R.T. Williams, Jr., Toward a Modern Exchange: 
The Peake-Mendelson-Williams Proposal for an Electronically Assisted Auction Market, in 
IMPENDING CHANGES FOR SECURITIES MARKETS: WHAT ROLE FOR THE EXCHANGES? 53, 67 
(Ernest Bloch & Robert A. Schwartz eds., 1979). 
 4. “NMS” refers to the National Market System. 
 5. “SRO” refers to self-regulatory organization. See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release 
No. 49,325, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,126 (Feb. 26, 2004) (codified at 17 CFR pts. 200, 230, 240, 242, and 
249) (citations omitted). 
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implement Regulation NMS. Nor do they reflect the true price tag being 
paid by investors and issuers through their brokers and market centers. 
In 1971, both the House and Senate held investigative hearings; in 
1973, legislative hearings were held that culminated in the May Day 
enactment of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, which were 
intended to foster competition among the securities markets. I testified at a 
number of House and Senate hearings leading up to the Amendments. 
In 1975, section 11A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 became 
law. Congress ordered the Commission to: 
[U]se its authority under this title to facilitate the establishment of a 
national market system for securities (which may include subsystems for 
particular types of securities with unique trading characteristics) in 
accordance with the findings and to carry out the objectives set forth in 
paragraph (1) of this subsection.6 
Many believed that accomplishing the mandate entrusted to the 
Commission would be straightforward and rapid. Although we are now 
starting the fourth decade since that fateful May Day legislation, Regulation 
NMS, the latest iteration of the SEC’s instructions to facilitate this task, was 
not started until March 2007.7 
A. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
When Professor Morris Mendelson of the Wharton School, R.T. 
Williams, Jr., my fellow consultant, and I submitted to the Commission’s 
National Market Advisory Board our National Book System (NBS) 
proposal for the development of the NMS in 1976, we wrote: 
While it may appear that some of the elements of our proposed National 
Book System differ substantially from the present mechanism, the fact 
remains that our system will cost less to design, build, operate and regulate 
than any interim system. It will also be simpler to construct and will 
restore a centralized trading facility. Any attempt made to obtain a system 
such as we present, in stages, must result in a sequence of fully developed 
systems, each operating only long enough to permit the next stage to be 
constructed before being discarded.8 
Specifically, our NBS proposal recommended several important 
features, including: screen-based electronic auction trading; consolidation 
of market makers’ bids and offers with customers’ bids and offers into a 
“book” of all orders for each security; an instantly accessible display of the 
aggregate quantities of all bids and offers at each price; anonymity for all 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Exchange Act § 11A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2) (2000). 
 7. Gaston F. Ceron, New Trading Rules to Launch, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2007, at C3. 
 8. Letter from Junius W. Peake, Morris Mendelson & R.T. Williams, Jr., to George A. 
Fitzsimmons, Sec’y, SEC, Reference: File No. 57-619 (Apr. 24, 2000), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/ny9948/peake1.htm [hereinafter April 24, 2000 Letter]. 
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orders entered; minimum price increments in decimals; price-time priority 
for execution of all entered bids and offers; multilateral price negotiation; 
and equal and instant information and global access by all qualified 
participants, including investors, dealers, market makers and specialists.9 
The Commission did address these issues. It started out by proposing an 
automated central limit order book (CLOB). On December 19, 1975, the 
Commission issued Exchange Act Release No. 11,942, which stated 
unambiguously the reasons why it was necessary. 
Development of a central electronic repository for limited price orders 
would be of special significance to ensure integration of the markets and 
preservation of an opportunity for public orders to meet without the 
participation of a dealer. Such a step will certainly enhance competitive 
opportunities in market makings. For all these reasons, the Commission 
will utilize its new powers under the Act promptly to ensure 
implementation of a national mechanism for multi-market protection of 
limit orders. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that it would be 
inappropriate to withhold from the markets the benefits to be derived from 
increased market maker competition indefinitely. Development of a 
national limit order mechanism is a further step in creating a national 
market system and must be expedited.10 
And in 1976, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 12,159 further elaborated 
on the need for automation. 
The Commission believes that there is a need for further modernization 
and improvement of our securities markets, not only for the purpose of 
utilizing new data processing and communication techniques, but also to 
insure economically efficient execution of securities transactions and fair 
competition among brokers and dealers and among various securities 
markets which either directly compete with each other or have the 
potential for such competition. Existing exchange mechanisms for the 
storage and execution of limited price orders appear to be in need of 
modification to meet the requirements of member firms and investors for 
expeditious handling of order flow in the context of a national market 
system, as well as to cope with an increasing volume of securities 
transactions (such as that experienced in recent weeks). Further, existing 
limit order mechanisms are unable to provide nationwide limit order 
protection and thus cannot always provide the degree of protection for 
limit orders which hopefully could be furnished by a composite book. 
Finally, a composite book appears to be well suited to assuring an 
opportunity for public orders to meet without the participation of a 
dealer.11 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Mendelson, Peake, & Williams, supra note 3, at 53, 67. 
 10. Exchange Act Release No. 11,942, 41 Fed. Reg. 4507 (Jan. 30, 1976). 
 11. Exchange Act Release No. 12,159, 9 SEC Docket 76, at *1 (Mar. 2, 1976). 
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The Commission further responded in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 
14,416, dated January 26, 1978, which explained the goals of the SEC. 
The concept of a national market system was first articulated in the 
Commission’s letter of transmittal accompanying its Institutional Investor 
Study, submitted to Congress on March 10, 1971. There the Commission 
stated that: 
[a] major goal and ideal of the securities market and the securities 
industry has been the creation of a strong central market system 
for securities of national importance, in which all buying and 
selling interest in these securities could participate and be 
represented under a competitive regime.12 
Again, quoting from the 1978 Release: 
In addition to elaborating on the principles set forth in the Future Structure 
Statement, the Commission’s Policy Statement articulated two new 
proposals to govern trading within a national market system: an auction 
trading rule, which would provide price priority protection for all public 
orders entered in a proposed central electronic repository, and a public 
preference rule, which would accord preferential treatment to public 
orders entered in the central electronic repository by preventing securities 
professionals acting as principal from competing for execution with such 
orders unless such professionals bettered public bids or offers entered in 
that system.13 
In reporting the legislative history of the 1975 Amendments, the same 
Release stated: 
[T]he Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (the 
“Senate Committee”) stated that  
[t]he rapid attainment of a national market system . . . is 
important . . . to assure that the country maintains a strong, 
effective and efficient capital raising and capital allocating 
system in the years ahead.14 
And again: 
The Senate Committee noted, however, that auction trading principles 
could not be perfected under existing circumstances because of 
fragmentation of the markets, particularly “the lack of a mechanism by 
which all buying and selling interest in a given security can be centralized 
and thus assure public investors best execution.” Thus, the concept of 
implementing a nationwide system according price and time priority to all 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, 43 Fed. Reg. 4354, 4354 (Feb. 1, 1978) (quoting 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-64, pt. 1, at xxiv (1971)). 
 13. Id. at 4355.  
 14. Id. (quoting SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT 
TO ACCOMPANY S. 249, S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 3 (1975)).  
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limit orders of public investors over all professional orders, regardless of 
where such limit orders originate or in what market center professional 
orders may be executed, received considerable support from the draftsmen 
of the 1975 Amendments.15 
Discussing progress to date, the Release continued: 
The major problems to which the idea of a national market system is 
addressed are those arising from “market fragmentation,” or the existence 
of multiple, geographically separated forums in which trading in the same 
security occurs, and from the institutionalization of the markets.16 
The Release then specifically discussed “THE COMMISSION’S 
FUTURE PLANS FOR FACILITATING ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM.”17 In those plans, these prophetic words 
appeared: 
The adverse consequences of failing to achieve more rapid progress 
toward a national market system have become particularly apparent in the 
context of the Commission’s pending proceeding concerning removal of 
exchange off-board trading restrictions. During the course of that 
proceeding, many elements of the securities industry, members of 
Congress and representatives of American business have urged the 
Commission to assume a leadership role in developing a national market 
system in order to overcome the impediments to development of that 
system inherent in the diversity of the securities industry, so that the 
benefits to the markets, the professional trading community and the public 
which the Congress and the Commission have long believed would inure 
from that system might finally be secured. Commentators in that 
proceeding, for example, were virtually unanimous in the view that the 
risks which many believe would attend removal of the remaining off-
board trading restrictions could be minimized by assuring more effective 
integration of the markets for securities presently covered by those 
restrictions by means of national market system mechanisms.18 
In regard to nationwide limit order protection, the Commission stated: 
The Commission continues to believe that one of the basic principles upon 
which a national market system must be based is the assurance that all 
agency orders in qualified securities, regardless of location, receive the 
benefits of auction-type trading protections. To this end, the Commission 
believes the several self-regulatory organizations should take joint action 
promptly to develop and implement a central limit order file (the “Central 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Id. at 4356. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. (capitalization in original). 
 18. Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, 43 Fed. Reg. 4354, 4357–58 (Feb. 1, 1978). 
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File”) for public agency orders to buy and sell qualified securities in 
specified amounts at specified prices (“public limit orders”).19 
The Commission concluded by saying: 
The Commission urges the self-regulatory organizations to prepare and 
submit to the Commission, preferably jointly, a plan or plans no later than 
September 30, 1978, contemplating the design, construction and operation 
of a Central File. However, should voluntary cooperation among such 
organizations to that end prove difficult, or involve undue delay, the 
Commission intends to commence rulemaking to consider the manner and 
timing of compulsory development of a Central File (including the 
question of whether that task should be assigned principally to a single 
self-regulatory organization).20 
But, in 1979, thanks to intensive lobbying efforts by the NYSE and 
other exchanges and market makers to preserve the status quo, the SEC 
suddenly reversed course and permitted a trio of unconnected systems to be, 
as the Commission put it, the “cornerstones” of the national market system. 
That reversal sealed the unconscionable delay of a national market system, 
at least for the rest of the 20th Century. In their April 1979 Exchange Act 
Release No. 15,770, the SEC stated: 
Most other self-regulatory organizations opposed creation of a Central File 
as described in the January Statement. These commentators argued that 
the kind of priority proposed to be afforded public limit orders entered into 
the Central File would have significant and deleterious effects on the 
exchange trading process. In essence, these commentators asserted that 
such a preference for public limit orders would provide a major trading 
advantage to those orders, thereby creating a disincentive to the 
commitment of market making capital by dealers, and would eventually 
lead to the elimination of exchange trading floors by inexorably forcing all 
trading into a fully automated trading system. In addition, several self-
regulatory organizations suggested that, in lieu of the immediate 
implementation of a Central File, the Commission should permit the 
participants in the Intermarket Trading System (“ITS”) sufficient time to 
attempt to provide limit order protection on an inter-market basis using the 
ITS. Specifically, the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (“NYSE”) and the 
MSE submitted proposals which envisioned the electronic dissemination 
and display of limit order information from each market center and use of 
the ITS to assure inter-market price protection of displayed limit orders in 
any market.21 
The CLOB was to be a straightforward electronic file of all entered bids 
and offers for each security. All bids and offers would be queued in price-
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at 4359. 
 20. Id. at 4359 (emphasis added). 
 21. Exchange Act Release No. 15,770, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,692, 26,694 (Apr. 26, 1979) (emphasis 
added). 
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time priority, and executions would occur on a first-come, first-served 
basis. Designing and building such a computer system would be relatively 
simple in terms of programming. 
Not surprisingly, led by the NYSE, the broker-dealer establishment 
attacked such a system as being nothing but a “black box” solution. And 
they asked where a computer would obtain the capital to trade. They said 
such a system (a) would not work, and (b) would destroy the finest capital 
market mechanism in the world. Instead, they promoted separate order 
entry, order displays, and reporting systems that would negate an integrated 
electronic one. The Intermarket Trading System was one cornerstone of 
their proposal. Interestingly enough, then President of Merrill Lynch, 
William Schreyer, testified under oath before two House Subcommittees in 
1979 that “[i]t is as far from the concept of an automated, efficient 
marketplace as a tom-tom is from a communications satellite.”22 
The other elements of the NYSE’s version of the national market 
system included a separate Consolidated Quotations System (CQS), and a 
separate Consolidated Tape System (CTS). 
I have analogized these disparate systems with a comparable 
Automated Teller System. Under such a system it would be necessary to go 
to one ATM to enter the transaction amount, another ATM to obtain the 
results of the transaction, and a third ATM to obtain a report of the trans-
action. I believe very few—if any—would prefer such a system to the 
actual automated teller systems available today. The present-day ATM 
differs from its analogous market system because competition and private 
enterprise, rather than mandated regulations, fostered the development of 
the ATM system. 
II. PRESENT ISSUES: THE ORIGINAL SOLUTION IS STILL 
RELEVANT TODAY 
Presently, there are four interesting issues in the state of the national 
market system: (1) balancing the demands for competition and consoli-
dation against the dangers of fragmentation, (2) whether trading markets 
will be electronic or manual, (3) to what extent (if any) retail and 
institutional interests will be reconciled, and (4) how to enforce best 
execution as a legal standard. 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Progress Toward the Development of a National Market System: Joint hearings before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and 
Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong. 70 (1979), quoted in 
Letter from Junius W. Peake, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC, Regarding File No. 4-206, 
Exchange Act Release No. 40,204 (Aug. 21, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/4208/peake1.htm. 
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A. BALANCING THE DEMANDS FOR COMPETITION AND 
CONSOLIDATION AGAINST THE DANGERS OF FRAGMENTATION 
Today, it is important to balance the demands for competition and 
consolidation against the dangers of fragmentation. I think that all 
economists know that a securities market is a natural monopoly unless 
prevented from becoming one by technological limitations, regulation or 
unfair competition. The best and most open prices are attained when all 
potential buyers and sellers can have the opportunity to have their orders 
interact. 
Competition should focus on price—not place. When securities markets 
were manual because of the technological inability to centralize them, 
exchanges and broker-dealers would trade the same securities at the same 
time in different locations and at different prices forming “pools” of orders. 
This enabled intermarket arbitrage—the buying or selling of a security at 
one location and immediately selling or buying it back at a guaranteed 
profit at another location—and was prima facie evidence that the system 
was inefficient. 
Today, the buzzword is “liquidity pools,” with the newest one being 
“dark liquidity pools,” primarily comprised of hedge funds. But what is 
needed is an “ocean” of liquidity formed by integrating all the pools into a 
format wherein each and every bid in a security has the opportunity to 
interact with each and every offer in that security. 
The main argument against letting the new securities market become a 
natural monopoly has been—and still is—that competition will be stifled 
and the market mechanisms will suffer. I disagree. Just as clearing and 
depository have been centralized, market structure centralization would 
improve services and reduce costs, provided it is properly structured and 
governed. 
B. ELECTRONIC VS. MANUAL TRADING MARKETS 
Going forward, it is important to assess whether the trading markets 
will be electronic or manual. This is a no-brainer. The recently announced 
proposed merger of Chicago’s derivative exchanges punctuates the answer 
forcefully. As one of the founders of the world’s first electronic futures 
exchange, I am thrilled—but not surprised—that automation has won the 
day. 
While the NYSE is continuing to push its Hybrid market structure, it is 
only the Commission’s acquiescence to the NYSE’s anticompetitive floor 
trading rule proposals that have allowed it to come this far. So, why does 
the Commission approve the anticompetitive rule changes proposed by the 
NYSE? I sent a comment to the Commission on Releases SR-NYSE-2006-
65 (November, 2006) and SR-NYSE-2006-36 (October, 2006): 
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I would like to make but one point about the NYSE’s proposals in their 
Hybrid Market. There never is—and cannot ever be—any discretion in an 
order entered electronically. All of the preconditions under which the 
order will be executed, cancelled or changed must be determined and 
entered before its arrival at the execution engine (the processor). It makes 
no difference if it is called a floor broker’s so-called “discretionary” order 
or a specialist’s algorithmic order. The terms which will decide any action 
on these orders have been predetermined. Since this is a fact, and since 
investors and all other market participants have the theoretical or practical 
capacity to place complex conditions on orders entered electronically, 
there is absolutely no regulatory reason to prevent them from having 
exactly the same ability to enter so-called “discretionary” orders or 
algorithmic orders. As a result of the Commission’s apparent willingness 
to permit the NYSE to have such unfair competitive advantages for their 
floor brokers and specialists, I assume that all broker/dealers and investors 
will be able to enter so-called discretionary orders and use algorithmic 
orders on all market centers except the NYSE. . . . I cannot believe the 
Commission’s intent is to approve proposed rules of the NYSE that would 
create unfair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange 
markets and markets other than exchange markets, as well as denying 
investors’ orders to be executed without the participation of a dealer (floor 
brokers are also registered as broker-dealers).23 
While the actual execution of all orders will be done electronically, pre-
trade strategy will continue by personal judgment (manually) assisted by 
technology. 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Junius W. Peake, Comment on Releases SR-NYSE-2006-65 and SR-NYSE-2006-36, 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2006-65/nyse200665-1.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) 
(emphasis in original). Section 11A(a)(1)(C) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78k-1 (2000), states: 
It is in the public interest and appropriate for the protection of investors and the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets to assure— 
i. economically efficient execution of securities transactions; 
ii. fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and 
between exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets; 
iii. the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors of information with respect to 
quotations for and transactions in securities;  
iv. the practicability of brokers executing investors’ orders in the best market; and  
v. an opportunity, consistent with the provisions of clauses (i) and (iv) of this 
subparagraph, for investors’ orders to be executed without the participation of a 
dealer.  
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C. RECONCILING RETAIL AND INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS 
As markets evolve, it is yet to be determined to what extent (if any), 
and how, retail and institutional interests should be reconciled. The interests 
of retail and institutional investors are congruent. Although reconciliation is 
not required, both groups want to pay the very least net cost for their 
purchases and to receive the largest net proceeds for their sales. A properly-
designed market system should be able to accommodate both interests. 
Automation has made multiple execution reports a trivial matter. Innovation 
and competition will get the job done. 
D. ENFORCING BEST EXECUTION AS A LEGAL STANDARD 
It is also necessary to develop a solution for the problem of how to 
enforce best execution as a legal standard. In order to do that “best 
execution” must be properly defined. A simple definition is the easiest to 
enforce. Today’s definition is far too complicated and focuses in the wrong 
direction—on orders, rather than executions. In 2002, I counted 533 
references by the SEC to the term “best execution” since the Commission 
started issuing ‘34 Act Releases. The first was in 1938; the next was in 
1963. Three hundred fifty-five of the references were issued from 1992 to 
2002.24 
Early on, best execution referred to transactions rather than orders. In 
the 1963 Special Study of the Securities Industry, the Commission wrote: 
The Report concludes that the factors contributing to or detracting from 
the public’s ready access to all markets and its assurance of obtaining the 
best execution of any particular transaction require the continuous 
attention of the Commission and the Policy and Planning Unit.25 
In the same report, the Commission further noted: 
[W]hile the NASD has recognized the principle of best execution, it has 
not prescribed specific guidelines or standards with respect to it. The 
Report recommends that rules and standards be adopted by the 
Commission and/or the NASD requiring broker-dealers executing retail 
transactions, whether as principal or as agent, to make a reasonable effort 
to ascertain the best interdealer quotations and “to provide an execution as 
favorable as may reasonably be obtained in light of the kind and amount 
of securities involved and other pertinent circumstances.”26 
More recently, the subject of what should receive best execution has 
metamorphosed from transactions to orders. There can be a considerable 
difference between the two: execution always equals transaction, but order 
                                                                                                                 
 24. A LexisNexis search in the source SEC Decisions, Orders & Releases for “best execution,” 
until April 21, 2002 returns 355 releases. 
 25. Special Market Study, Release No. 32 (July 17, 1963) (emphasis added). 
 26. Special Market Study, Release No. 31 (July 17, 1963) (emphasis added). 
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may, or may not, equal transaction. In 1968, the Commission addressed the 
difference: “One of the basic duties of a fiduciary is the duty to execute 
securities transactions for clients in such a manner that the client’s total cost 
or proceeds in each transaction is the most favorable under the 
circumstances . . . .”27 
As previously noted, in securities markets, investors and other traders 
each want only one thing. Buyers want to pay the smallest total amount for 
each execution. Sellers want to receive the greatest proceeds for each 
execution. When an order is executed in more than a single transaction, the 
investor would like to receive the highest aggregated proceeds for the entire 
sale, or the lowest total cost for the entire purchases. The Commission has 
the ability to define precisely the term “best execution” for each transaction 
in a national market system, but always uses broad generalities to attempt to 
define best execution for orders requiring multiple transactions. Orders 
determined to require more than a single transaction have but one thing in 
common: They need the professional skill and judgment of the person or 
persons responsible for fulfilling the order. Experts may execute large 
orders differently, depending on their differing judgments, just as 
competent and skilled attorneys will handle the same case differently. 
Attempts to measure best execution of complicated orders will always be 
subjective. 
Complicated orders—especially large orders for hundreds of thousands 
or millions of shares entered by institutional investors—may require 
multiple trade executions, sometimes taking one or more days. This may be 
required to accrue the lowest overall cost or the highest proceeds. But if 
each and every trade execution, at the time it is made, is made at the highest 
bid (for a purchase) or the lowest offer (for a sale), the total cost or proceeds 
of the entire order will assure best order execution, provided reasonable 
judgment and care is taken with the order. 
The term price improvement is fraudulent. In every market, for a trade 
to take place, a bid must be hit or an offer taken. The Commission itself 
defines “best bid” and “best offer” as follows: “Best bid and best offer 
mean the highest priced bid and the lowest priced offer.”28 At the moment 
of execution, the spread must be zero. There can be no price improvement, 
since a bid must be hit or an offer taken. 
The issue becomes: Who gets to see and trade with the best bid or 
offer? Price improvement is only possible if the market system hides either 
the bid or the offer (or both) from some market participants. If the best bid 
and offer is neither disclosed nor executable by all market participants, it 
becomes a “Tantalus system.” Tantalus was condemned to hang from the 
                                                                                                                 
 27. In the Matter of Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., Edward B. Goodnow, Investment Advisors 
Act Release No. 232, Exchange Act Release No. 8426, 43 S.E.C. 911, 915 (Oct. 16, 1968). 
 28. 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(7) (2007).  
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bough of a fruit tree over a pool of water. When he bent to drink, the water 
would recede; when he reached for a fruit, the wind would blow it from his 
reach. A further account of his punishment tells of a great stone hanging 
over his head threatening to fall.29 Like Tantalus, some best bids and/or 
offers are always kept out of reach of certain market participants. 
Designing state-of-the-art trading systems is a task best left to the free 
market, not Commission lawyers who tend to create Alice in Wonderland 
solutions. It has been more than three decades since the Congress mandated 
that the Commission facilitate the development of a national market system 
for securities.30 
The following is what the Commission itself said about proposed Rule 
(11Ac1-5): “While broker-dealers currently may be able to obtain order 
execution information from some market centers, that information may be 
of limited use and may not allow broker-dealers to compare execution 
quality among the different market centers.”31 The problem with the 
Commission’s best execution definition is that the best published quote is 
seldom made up of all the bids and offers available at a moment in time. 
There are often better bids and offers, but there is no practical or 
economical way for all orders to interact with them. 
The only way for the best execution of each transaction to be 
guaranteed is for all bids and offers in any particular security to be able to 
interact, preferably on a price-time priority basis. Best execution of a 
multiple transaction order will still require skill and judgment, as it should. 
But the cost of such a system would probably be at least one order of 
magnitude less than the present multiple, cobbled-together systems that 
have been ordered by the Commission since 1975. 
Below, in a brief excerpt from the Commission’s staff, is an attempt to 
explain the complexities of the reporting requirements that make up the raw 
data to measure best execution: 
Division of Market Regulation: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 12R (Revised) 
“Frequently Asked Questions About Rule 11Ac1-5” 
Action: Publication of Division of Market Regulation Staff Legal Bulletin 
Date: June 22, 2001 (revised). . .  
The Commission adopted the Rule in November 2000. It generally 
requires a “market center” (as defined in the Rule) that trades national 
market system securities to make available to the public monthly 
electronic reports that include uniform statistical measures of execution 
quality . . . . 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Tantalus, Infoplease, http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/ent/A0847814.html (last visited Mar. 
28, 2007). 
 30. See Exchange Act §11A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §78k-1(a)(2) (2000). 
 31. Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 43,590, 
65 Fed. Reg. 75,414, 75,432 (Dec. 1, 2000). 
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Question 1: Format of Monthly Reports and Procedures for Making 
Reports Publicly Available 
Question 2: Vendor or SRO Assistance in Making Reports Available 
Question 3: Definition of Market Center - Multiple Trading Venues 
Question 4: Integrated Broker-Dealer Firms - Orders Received as Market 
Center and Orders Received Solely as Agent for Routing 
Question 5: Definition of Covered Order - Special Handling Exclusions 
Question 6: Exemption for Manually-Received Orders 
Question 7: Locked and Crossed Quotes 
Question 8: Trading Halts 
Question 9: Activity Within the Intermarket Trading System (“ITS”) 
Question 10: Activity within SuperSOES and SelectNet (modified) 
Question 11: Partial Executions and/or Partial Cancellations 
Question 12: Orders Left Unexecuted and Uncancelled at End of Regular 
  Trading Hours 
Question 13: Establishing Time of Order Receipt 
Question 14: Orders Received in Same Second as a Quote Change 
Question 15: Time of Execution for “Stopped” or “Guaranteed” Orders 
Question 16: Adjusted or Voided Order Executions 
Question 17: Calendar Month Reporting 
Question 18: Phase-In of Reporting 
Question 19: Exemption for Orders Received Prior to Dissemination of 
Quotations by Primary Listing SRO (new) 
Question 20: Filtering Potential Errors in Consolidated Best Bid and  
Offer (new) 
Question 21: Time of Consolidated Best Bid and Offer (new) 
Question 22: Rounding of Statistics (new) 
Question 23: Modified Orders (new) 
Question 24: Riskless Principal Orders (new) 
Question 25: Exemption for Inactively Traded Securities (new) 
Question 26: Exemption for Small Market Centers (new) 
Question 27: Exemption for Block Orders (new)32 
In order to determine how accurate the results of analyzing this type of 
data have been until now, all we have to do is to read the lead story in the 
October 16, 2006 issue of Global Investment Technology, entitled, 
Transaction Costs: Buy-Side Firms Want Transaction Cost Analysis 
Offerings to Incorporate Risk in Real Time. The article states in part: 
[Transaction Cost Analysis] pioneers who analyzed transaction data and 
reported on it quarterly are finding periodic reports outmoded. . . . The 
biggest impediment to effective TCA is always the data itself, according to 
Ian Domowitz, Chief Executive Officer of ITG Solutions Network, a 
                                                                                                                 
 32. SEC, Division of Market Regulation: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 12R (Revised): Frequently 
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division of ITG Inc., an agency brokerage and trading technologies 
provider whose offerings include TCA solutions. “The nature of change in 
the market structure both validates and renews [the] emphasis on best 
execution within which regulators can actually regulate[.]” . . . Investors 
still look at individual orders, Domowitz explains. But the orders are being 
broken down into small trades and spread out over time, so analysis of the 
order can be quite difficult.33 
In conclusion, the clean, straightforward electronic trading system that 
could have been built in the 1976–1979 period (and can still be built) has 
now become a Rube Goldberg-type Gordian knot created by the 
Commission.34 Reading and trying to understand all the complex rule 
proposals for the NYSE’s Hybrid system is an absolute cure for insomnia. 
In my judgment, it is now time for the Commission to engage a staff that is 
intimately familiar with both trading and the appropriate use of electronics, 
and create the national market system the Congress wanted. Using the 
definition of “entropy” I have selected, the Commission surely has jumbled 
and disordered its logic, which occurred after the program was modified 
over and over in three decades. There is still time to do what the Congress 
ordered. 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS: ONGOING CONCERNS 
There are a few additional issues that I would like to address in this 
commentary. I have long been concerned about the continued approval, 
albeit with changes, of section 28e. I see no reason mutual fund or other 
investors should pay excessive execution costs that are charged to the 
benefit of managers. I am also concerned about the dangers of naked short 
selling, especially immediately after an original offering. Total trading 
volumes the day following effective registration can sometimes exceed the 
total available float of the new issue. I am also worried about the enormous 
impact of hedge funds on our capital markets. I would hope the 
Commission would continue to examine their potential to damage the 
integrity of our markets. Finally, I hope and trust that if the Congress 
eliminates the one cent coin from circulation, that it continues one cent 
increments as the minimum price differential in trading equities and 
options. 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Transaction Costs: Buy-Side Firms Want Transaction Cost Analysis Offerings to 
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